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Abstract
We develop a logic for reasoning about semi-public environments, that
is, environments in which a process is executing, and where agents in
the environment have partial and potentially different views of the pro-
cess. Previous work on this problem illustrated that it was problematic
to obtain both an adequate semantic model and a language for reasoning
about semi-public environments. We here use program models for repre-
senting the changes that occur during the execution of a program. These
models serve both as syntactic objects and as semantic models, and are
a modification of action models in Dynamic Epistemic Logic, in the sense
that they allow for ontic change (i.e., change in the world or state). We
show how program models can elegantly capture a notion of observation
of the environment. The use of these models resolves several difficulties
identified in earlier work, and admit a much simpler treatment than was
possible in previous work on semi-public environments.
1 Introduction
We are interested in settings where agents are involved in a (possibly non-
deterministic) computational activity in which the computation itself is per-
formed publicly, but the data is distributed privately. Specifically, agents are
assumed to have only partial knowledge of the values of the variables used in the
computation. In this setting, the basic question to which we address ourselves
in this work is: What can we say about what the agents know and learn as the
computation proceeds?
We begin with a simple example, to illustrate the general setting of semi-
public environments:
Suppose we have three variables, say x , y , and z , and we have an
agent i who can see only the variable z . We aim to have a program
that swaps the values of x and y , using only assignments of the form
a := b, where a and b are program variables. Now, can we do this
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in our setting without i learning anything about the values of the
variables x and y? Although i cannot directly see the value of x or
y , the “standard” solution to this problem (using z as a temporary
variable) will result in i knowing the value of one of the variables.
Van der Hoek et al [22] give more examples: among others, they show how
the dining cryptographers problem can be modelled as a semi-public environ-
ment. Again, this is an example of a setting where there is a commonly agreed
computation, but the data (the outcomes of the toss of a coin) is not.
Although there is much related work in the literature, to the best of our
knowledge this issue was first explicitly considered in [22]. This work illustrates
that it is problematic both to develop an appropriate language for reasoning
about semi-public environments, and at the same time develop an appropriate
semantic model for such a language. The approach presented in the current
paper resolves several difficulties and limitations identified by Van der Hoek et
al [22] (see below, when describing our contributions).
Our work in particular, and semi-public environments in general, are in the
intersection of at least three closely related research areas:
• First, they are closely related to interpreted systems [8], where what an
agent knows derives from what agents can see about their environments
(typically, their internal state).
• Second, the way in which we model programs in our work is close to that of
Propositional Dynamic Logic (dl, [12]), which uses basic programs as the
building blocks, and combines them to create more complex ones. Note
that pdl is a language for reasoning about ontic change, i.e., change in
the real world or the real state.
• Third, our work is a close relative of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (del, [27]),
which is intended for reasoning about information change, i.e., changes in
the knowledge or beliefs of agents.
One approach to modelling informational change in del is with using action
models – see [2, 3] and [27, Chapter 6]. Their domain is that of abstract actions
together with an accessibility relation capturing which actions ‘look the same’
for which agents. The first papers on action models already suggested that it
would be ‘obvious’ to include mechanisms to deal with ontic change in such
models. Work in del that tried to study ontic change and informational change
in one and the same framework were subsequently undertaken in [28, 29], in [21]
and in [25], among others.
We utilize such models, where actions can have both an ontic (change the
world) and an epistemic (change the information) effect to build program models
where the notion of visibility of the environment plays a central role.1
1We use the term program models for models that represent both ontic and epistemic
change, and action models for actions modelling epistemic change. Note that [2] uses the
term program models for what we call action models.
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A key design principle in this paper is that of simplicity: we make a number
of assumptions that keep our approach technically lightweight. For example,
programs handle propositional variables, and there are only finitely many such
variables. In addition, we assume that which agent sees which variables is
common knowledge. Finally, we allow public announcements only on objective
formulas, rather than on epistemic/dynamic ones. Obviously, lifting (some of)
these assumptions offers interesting questions for further research.
Our paper makes the following contributions: we give a realistic interpreta-
tion of the program construct ∪ in semi-public environments, different from that
of [22]; we employ program models to give a clear interpretation to such pro-
grams; we show that the logic for semi-public environments is in fact equivalent
to epistemic logic enriched with a notion of vision; our use of program models
is the first to employ action models that give an account on such a notion; us-
ing program models, we obtain a relatively simple and natural axiomatisation
for semi-public environments, without the need to use a universal modality, as
in [22] and, finally, in contrast with the mentioned paper, we are able to shed
light on sequential composition and iteration within the context of semi-public
environments.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
• In Section 2 we provide the context, language, and models of our logic
along with truth definitions for its formulas.
• Section 3 contains the definition for the class of program models, and the
specific program models corresponding to the several meta-logical pro-
grams. We then show that these two classes of models coincide. Section 3
also contains a finite axiomatisation and a completeness result – we point
out the validities that will serve as axioms along the way. Section 4 refers
to notions of equality between our programs.
• Section 5 discusses related work and concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we will be dealing with a set Ag = {1, . . . ,m} of agents,
and a set Var = {x1, . . . , xn} of propositional variables. The variables Var
will be those manipulated by the programs. For each agent i ∈ Ag , we let
V (i) ⊆ Var be the set of variables visible to i . Thus the set V (i) represents
i ’s view of the environment. The set of propositional formulas is denoted by
L0. A valuation θ : Var → {true, false} assigns a truth value to each variable
xj ∈ Var . The set of all valuations is denoted by Θ. For two valuations θ1, θ2,
we write θ1 ∼i θ2 if for all x ∈ V (i), θ1(x ) = θ2(x ), i.e., θ1 and θ2 coincide on
the values of the variables observed by agent i . We extend this definition in a
natural way; for I ⊆ Ag we write θ1 ∼I θ2 if for all i ∈ I , θ1 ∼i θ2.
Definition 1 (Toggling values) Let θ ∈ Θ and S ⊆ Var. The toggling of
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values for the variables in S in θ, notation ˜(S )(θ), is defined as follows:
˜(S )(θ)(x ) =
{
not θ(x ) if x ∈ S
θ(x ) otherwise
Also, slightly abusing notation, for ϕ0 ∈ L0 we define ˜(S )(ϕ0), as:
˜(S )(ϕ0) =
{
ϕ0 if S = ∅
˜(S \ {x})ϕ0[¬x/x ] for any x ∈ S
where ϕ0[¬x/x ] denotes the formula ϕ0 with every occurrence of x replaced by
¬x .
Given two sets of variables S1 and S2, we denote S14S2 to be their symmetric
difference, i.e., S14S2 = (S1 ∪ S2) \ (S1 ∩ S2).
So ˜(V )(θ) is like θ, but with the assignment of values to variables in V
toggled. Obviously, ˜(∅) is the identity function: ˜(∅)(θ) = θ. An examples of
applying a toggle to a formula is obtained by ˜({x , y})((x ∨ ¬y) ↔ z ) which
yields (¬x ∨ ¬¬y)↔ z .
2.1 Language and Models
We now define our object language for reasoning about semi-public environ-
ments. In our setting, programs have both a syntactic and semantic flavour:
our basic construct is a pointed program model, denoted (M,w) or M,w, where
w is called a program point. The set of pointed program models will be formally
defined in Section 3; we denote this set by PM. The fact that a program has
several program points is to cater for the uncertainty by the agents in the envi-
ronment as to what the exact changes are, enforced by the program. The lan-
guage is an extension of the well-known multi-agent epistemic language S5n [8].
We have modal epistemic operators Ki , where Kiϕ expresses that agent i knows
ϕ, an operator Vi , where Vix indicates that variable x is visible to agent i , and
a dynamic “box” operator [M,w], where [M,w]ϕ means that the execution of
M,w leads to states where ϕ holds. Formally, the syntax of formulas ϕ of the
language L is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= > | xj | Vixj | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [M,w]ϕ | Kiϕ
where i ∈ Ag , xj ∈ Var , and M,w ∈ PM. We will use the standard classical logic
abbreviations for ⊥,∨,→ and ↔, and we write Miϕ ◦= ¬Ki¬ϕ and 〈M,w〉ϕ ◦=
¬[M,w]¬ϕ. We also introduce [M]ϕ for ∧w∈M[M,w]ϕ. A formula ψ ∈ L is called
program-free if it has no occurrences of [M,w]. Recall that the propositional
fragment of L is denoted by L0.
Definition 2 (Epistemic Models) An epistemic model M for L is a tuple
M = 〈W ,R,V , f 〉, where
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1. W is a finite (possibly empty) set of states;
2. f : W → Θ assigns a valuation θ to each state in W ;
3. V : Ag → 2Var keeps track of the variables that agent i ‘can see’;
4. R : Ag → 2(W×W ) assigns an accessibility relation to each agent i ∈ Ag.
We write uRiv or Ri(u, v) rather than (u, v) ∈ R(i). Each R(i) is an
equivalence relation, and moreover, we assume that uRiv implies f (u) ∼i
f (v).
If M = 〈W ,R,V , f 〉, we write w ∈ M for w ∈W . For u, v ∈ M , we write
u ∼i v if f (u) ∼i f (v). A pair (M , v) (with v ∈ M ) is called a pointed model.
Let EMm denote the class of pointed epistemic models for m agents. Finally,
the set of all vision functions V is denoted by Vis.
Note that Ri determines what agent i knows, while ∼i is the indistinguisha-
bility based on what i sees. We have Ri ⊆ ∼i : i.e., an agent can know more
than based on what he sees. Take for instance an agent i who sees x , and
consider a program that first assigns x the value of y , and then assigns x the
value of z . Although i does not see y , he does know its value after execution of
this program, since this value was assigned to x and is not changed since (the
formal definitions of these programs are given in Section 3).
We also ought to explain the definition of the set of states W . Given that the
sets Ag and Var are finite, and the set of possible values for the variables is finite
(true or false), we can assume that S5n is characterised by the class of finite
epistemic models (cf. [15], Section 2.1.5, finite model property). Furthermore,
as we will see later, program models are also finite, and thus there is no way
an infinite model will occur after the execution of a program. Regarding the
possibility of an empty model: it has no impact on our results (in terms of
validities, for instance) but it caters for the possibility of a program to ‘fail’, in
which case there are no resulting states.
Example 1 We use the following example of an epistemic model M (see Fig-
ure 1). Consider Ag = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and Var = {x , y}. Moreover, V (1) = {x},
V (2) = {y}, V (3) = V (4) = V (5) = {} and V (6) = {x , y}. In the figure, we
have given each state a name and the valuation it represents. For instance, f (z )
is the valuation that assigns true to x and false to y . Reflexive or transitive
arrows are not drawn, for instance every agent considers s possible given s, and
we also have R3(w , u) and R3(v , z ), for example. Agent 4 knows the value of x ,
and he knows the value of y if x is true, and agent 5 knows the value of y , and
also that of x if y is false. Agent 6 sees, and hence knows, the value of both
variables.
Definition 3 (Truth) Let M = 〈W ,R,V , f 〉 with W 6= ∅ be an epistemic
model, and M,w ∈ PM a pointed program model. The latter induces a rela-
tion between pointed epistemic models, where (M ,w)[|M,w|](M ′,w ′) means that
execution of the pointed program model M,w in (M ,w) leads to (M ′,w ′): the
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relation (M ,w)[|M,w|](M ′,w ′) will be defined in Section 3. We define the no-
tion “formula ϕ of the language L is true at (M ,w)”, denoted (M ,w) |= ϕ,
recursively as follows:
(M ,w) |= > is always the case;
(M ,w) |= x iff f (w)(x ) = true;
(M ,w) |= Vix iff x ∈ V (i);
(M ,w) |= ¬ϕ iff not (M ,w) |= ϕ;
(M ,w) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M ,w) |= ϕ and (M ,w) |= ψ;
(M ,w) |= Kiϕ iff wRiu implies (M , u) |= ϕ;
(M ,w) |= [M,w]ϕ iff (M ,w)[|M,w|](M ′,w ′) implies (M ′,w ′) |= ϕ.
We say that a formula ϕ in L is valid in M if it is true at every (M ,w) with
w ∈ M , and ϕ is valid if it is valid in every model M . Of course these notions
of validity are relative to the set PM that we will shortly specify.
Definition 4 (Model Equivalence) Let M = 〈W ,R,V , f 〉 and M ′ = 〈W ′,
R′, V ′, f ′〉 be two epistemic models, with w ∈ M and w ′ ∈ M ′. Then the pointed
epistemic models (M ,w) and (M ′,w ′) are equivalent (denoted M ,w ≡ M ′,w ′)
if for all ϕ ∈ L: M ,w |= ϕ iff M ′,w ′ |= ϕ. Moreover, M and M ′ are equivalent
(denoted M ≡ M ′) if for all ϕ ∈ L: M |= ϕ iff M ′ |= ϕ.
2,3,5
1,3,4 1,3
2,3
M
¬x, y
v
w
¬x,¬y x,¬y
z
u
x, y
Figure 1: M = 〈W ,R,V , f 〉.
3 Program Models
In Dynamic Epistemic Logic, one way to represent epistemic actions is by using
so-called action models: see, e.g., [3] and [27, Chapter 6]. Analogously (but
nevertheless differently), we will define program models M, where the pair (M,w)
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represents a program point w in program model M. One basic difference is that
we define program models as finite sets of pairs w = (ϕ0,X ), with ϕ0 being
a consistent propositional formula and X ⊆ Var a set of variables. Similarly
to actions in action models, the idea behind such a pair (ϕ0,X ) is that ϕ0
represents the precondition for the program point to be executed, and X is
the set of variables affected by the point, so they represent in some sense the
postcondition of w. We identify points (ϕ0,X ) and (ψ0,Y ) iff ϕ0 and ψ0 are
equivalent, and X = Y . More formally, consider the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
of L0. Let A be its carrier set, i.e., the set of equivalence classes [ϕ] based
on tautological equivalence. When clear from context we will often write ϕ
instead of [ϕ]. We define A− = A \ {⊥}. In words: A− represents the set of
consistent propositional formulas that are based on Var , with the constraint
that all members are mutually non-equivalent.
Definition 5 (Program Points and Models) Let A− and Var be as before.
• An element w ∈ A− × P(Var) is called a program point.
A program point w = (ϕ,X ) is called a basic program, if |X | ≤ 1. A basic
program is atomic if either ϕ = > or X = {}.
For any w = (ϕ,X ) we define the projections pre(w) = ϕ, called the
precondition for w, and tgl(w) = X , where tgl(w) are the variables that
are toggled by w.
• Any finite set of program points is called a program model.
Additionally, given a vision function V , the relation ≈Vi ⊆ M × M is
defined as follows: for all u,w ∈ M:
w ≈Vi u iff (tgl(w)4tgl(u)) ∩V (i) = ∅
The set of all pointed program models M,w, given L0 and Var, is denoted
by PM(L0,Var) or PM, if the parameters are clear from context.
So, given the visible variables V (i) of agent i , he cannot distinguish two
program points w and u if the changes they bring about are the same for the
variables in V (i). That is, agent i cannot distinguish w and u if for every
variable x ∈ V (i), either x gets changed by both w and u, or else both w and u
leave x untouched.
Unlike actions models, program models do not have an indistinguishability
relation as part of their definition. This is because our program models provide a
so-called concrete semantics, in the sense that the accessibility relations ≈Vi are
not abstract, given equivalence relations, but rather, they are exclusively derived
from our notion of visibility of the variables – the function V – and the toggle
sets tgl. In this sense, our program models are related to arbitrary action models
(in the sense of [27]) in the same way as interpreted systems ([8]) are related to
general models for knowledge ([15]). Moreover, we want at most one program
point of the same type in a program model. This is translated as considering
propositionally equivalent preconditions to be ‘the same’ and names for the
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program points not being part of the definition (again in contrast with action
models or even Kripke frames). The two differences above are essentially what
allow us to represent program models as a subset of a Cartesian product. Finally,
we insist on the preconditions being (propositionally) consistent formulas for
technical reasons, in relation to action emulation (Definition 16). This does not
affect our results on a conceptual level; if a program model had a program point
with an inconsistent precondition, nothing would change if we removed it, as
the specific program point could never be applied.
As a final comment on our program models, note that they can be conceived
of as pure syntactic objects. This implies that, despite their name, our use
of program models M,w in the syntax of our language L allows us to sidestep
(philosophical) discussions relating to the use of semantic objects in the object
language: a discussion which action models are frequently prone to (cf. [27,
Section 6.1]).
Definition 6 (Model product) Let M = 〈W ,R,V , f 〉 be an epistemic model,
and M be a program model. (M×M) is the epistemic model M ′ = 〈W ′,R′,V ′, f ′〉
defined as follows:
• W ′ = {(w ,w) | w ∈W ,w ∈ M & (M ,w) |= pre(w)};
• (w ,w)R′i(u, u) iff wRiu and w ≈Vi u;
• V ′ = V ;
• f ′((w ,w)) = ˜(tgl(w))(f (w)).
This definition says that the points of the new epistemic model M ×M are pairs
(w ,w) ∈ W ×M, but only those pairs for which pre(w) holds in w . Two such
points (w ,w) and (u, u) look the same for agent i if the epistemic points w and
u look the same for i , and the program points w and u look the same as well,
using the visibility function V from the epistemic model M . The visibility set
stays the same, and the valuation in (w ,w) is the one from w , but with the
variables in tgl(w) toggled.
Pending from Truth Definition 3 in Section 2 is the definition of the relation
[|M,w|]. The relation that M,w induces on epistemic pointed models says that
(M ,w)[|M,w|](M ′,w ′) iff
(M ,w) |= pre(w) and (M ′,w ′) = (M ×M, (w ,w))
In words: executing the pointed program (M,w) in the pointed epistemic model
(M ,w) leads to a new pointed epistemic model (M ′,w ′) iff the program (M,w)
is executable in (M ,w) and the pointed model (M ′,w ′) can be obtained as a
way of updating (M ,w) with the program (M,w).
From the second bullet of Definition 6 it becomes apparent that the vision
function V found in the epistemic model is ‘borrowed’ by the program model
being applied. We will need this fact to be reflected in our axiomatisation,
and so we will need to describe V with a formula (and not only in the meta-
language). Such a characteristic formula can be achieved by a conjunction of
literals of the special atoms Vix . Specifically,
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χV
◦
=
∧
i∈AG,
x∈V (i)
Vix ∧
∧
i∈AG,
x /∈V (i)
¬Vix .
We list the axioms regarding programs in Table 5 under “Dynamic Com-
ponent”. Of those, ontic change indicates that to calculate the effect of M,w
for a propositional formula ϕ0, we apply the toggling of the variables collected
in tgl(w) to ϕ0. Soundness of all properties in the dynamic component in this
table follow from the definition of [|M,w|] and that of M ×M.
One way to think of pointed program models in the language, is that they are
in some sense ‘place holders’ that signal what kind of changes are happening.
To appreciate this statement, it may help to formulate a main result of this
paper at this stage, the proof of which is distributed over this section.
Theorem 1 Every formula ψ is equivalent to a program-free formula ψ′.
This theorem is proven by ‘pushing in’ occurrences of [M,w] in formulas of
the form [M,w]ϕ, and then showing that those occurrences can be abandoned
when ϕ is either of the form ϕ0 or Vix . The axioms under ‘Dynamic Component’
of Table 5 indicate how we will achieve this. For instance, we have [M,w](ψ1 ∧
ψ2)↔ ([M,w]ψ1∧[M,w]ψ2). How knowledge operators are dealt with is through
the so-called knowledge-reduction property ‘program and knowledge’ as given
in Table 5, and which we display in (kn red) below. This property is standard
in del, but because of its importance and the fact that we have to modify it
for our setting, we give a proof of its soundness in Lemma 1.
[M,w]Kiϕ↔
(
pre(w)→
∧
V∈Vis
(χV →
∧
w≈Vi u
Ki [M, u]ϕ)
)
(kn red)
Lemma 1 Property (kn red) is valid.
Proof Let M be an epistemic model with vision function V , w ∈ M and let M
be a program model, with w ∈ M. Let M ′ = M ×M as defined in Definition 6.
Suppose M ,w |= [M,w]Kiϕ∧ pre(w). For V ′ 6= V the implications are triv-
ially true, we need only concern ourselves with the single implication involving
V . By M ,w |= [M,w]Kiϕ we have M ′, (w ,w) |= Kiϕ. So for all (w ′,w′) with
R′i(w ,w)(w
′,w′), we have M ′, (w ′,w′) |= ϕ. Now let u ∈ M and v ∈ M be such
that w ≈Vi u and Riwv . We need to show that M , v |= [M, u]ϕ. If v does not
make pre(u) true, we are done. So suppose M , v |= pre(u). Then (v , u) ∈ M ′.
Since Riwv and w ≈Vi v, we have R′i(w ,w)(v , v) and hence M ′, (v , v) |= ϕ, which
achieves our aim.
For the converse, suppose M ,w |= pre(w)→ ∧V∈Vis(χV → ∧w≈Vi u Ki [M, u]ϕ).
If M ,w |= ¬pre(w), the goal M ,w |= [M,w]Kiϕ trivially holds. So now suppose
M ,w |= pre(w). Given also that M ,w |= χV , we have M ,w |=
∧
w≈Vi u Ki [M, u]ϕ.
We want to show that M ′, (w ,w) |= Kiϕ, so assume R′i(w ,w)(w ′,w′). By def-
inition of R′i , this means Riww
′ and w ≈Vi w′. The first of those statements
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implies M ,w ′ |= [M, u]ϕ for all u for which w ≈Vi u. This in turn implies
M ,w ′ |= [M,w′]ϕ, i.e., M ′, (w ′,w′) |= ϕ.
Note how the dynamic operator gets ‘pushed in’ when reading the equiva-
lence from left to right. It explains how agent i ’s knowledge that ϕ is obtained
after the performance of a program M,w: if the program is executable, then,
for every program M, u that looks the same for the agent, the agent knows that
it will bring about ϕ.
Another thing to note is that, when ‘filtering’ for the correct vision function
through the use of χV we could, instead of going through all vision functions,
restrict ourselves only to functions that map agent i to a subset of the variables
that appear in the toggle sets of M. For the sake of brevity we chose not to do
so.
In epistemic logic with dynamic operators, the principle [α]Kiϕ→ Ki [α]ϕ is
called no learning, or no surprise (or no miracles in [20]): everything an agent
will know after the execution of an action α, was already known in advance to
be a result of α.
Reversing the direction of no learning gives Ki [α]ϕ → [α]Kiϕ, a property
known as perfect recall: the agent remembers the effect he anticipates of the
action α. We will later in this paper discuss the extent to which our programs
satisfy no learning and perfect recall.
In the next section we identify the place of several meta-logical “programs”
in our setting, in fashion similar to dynamic logic.
Definition 7 The set of programs Prog, is defined (inductively) as follows:
• If ϕ0 ∈ L0 is a propositionally consistent formula, then !ϕ0 ∈ Prog, called
the public announcement of ϕ0;
• If x ∈ Var, then ˜x ∈ Prog, called the toggle of the value of x ;
• If x ∈ Var, and ϕ0 ∈ L0, then x := ϕ0 ∈ Prog, called the assignment of
x to the truth value of ϕ0;
• If pi1, pi2 ∈ Prog, then pi1 ∪ pi2 ∈ Prog, called the non-deterministic choice
between pi1 and pi2.
• If pi1, pi2 ∈ Prog, then pi1;pi2 ∈ Prog, called the sequential composition of
pi1 and pi2.
In addition to the usual sequential composition (“;”) and non-deterministic
choice (“∪”), we preoccupy ourselves with public announcement (“!”), as well
as an operator ˜x which toggles the value of x (from false to true or inversely).
Public announcement and Toggle are considered the basic constructs for this set
of programs as we will shortly see; assignment operations x := ϕ0 can be defined
in terms of the other constructs. It is also the case that ˜x could be defined
if we instead adopted assignment as our basic construct, so this exchange does
not have a serious impact.
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For each of the programs in the set Prog we identify a corresponding program
model. Strictly speaking, if M is the set of all program models, consider a
function I : Prog 7→ M. I (pi) = Mpi will be the program model for program pi.
The exact definition for this function is spread over the next subsections. We
also introduce the notation [pi]ϕ for [Mpi]ϕ.
3.1 Atomic Programs
Recall that atomic programs M,w come in two flavours: we start with those for
which tgl(w) = ∅.
Definition 8 (Public Announcement) The program model for public an-
nouncement !ϕ0 is the model M!ϕ0 = {e} = {(ϕ0, ∅)}.
By Definition 5, on M!ϕ0 we have ≈Vi = {(e, e)} for all i ∈ Ag and V ∈ Vis.
Example 2 (Public Announcement) See Figure 2 (middle) for the program
model for the announcement !x . On the right of the figure, we have M ×M!x .
This model is as expected: everybody knows that x is true, but agents 1 and
3 still do not know the value of y . Also agents 4 and 5 (who do not see any
variable) ‘remember’ the value of both x and y , and agent 6 (who sees all
variables) can of course distinguish the two results.
e
M!x
1,3
(u, e) x, y
(z, e) x,¬y
M ⇥M!x
⇥ =
(x, {})
2,3,5
1,3,4 1,3
2,3
M
¬x, y
v
w
¬x,¬y x,¬y
z
u
x, y
Figure 2: The product M ×M!x .
The knowledge reduction property for announcements is relatively simple:
[M!ϕ0 , e]Kiϕ↔ (ϕ0 → Ki [M!ϕ0 , e]ϕ) (kn red(announce))
This property can be derived from (kn red) by observing that M!ϕ0 has only
one action point e with e ≈Vi e and, moreover, that pre(e) = ϕ0. Some derived
properties of announcements are given in Table 1.
We have already seen that no surprise is not valid for arbitrary programs.
However, for pointed program models with a single program point, we imme-
diately derive from (kn red) that we have something that is very close, i.e.,
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Valid properties for announcement (ϕ0, ψ0 ∈ L0, ϕ ∈ L)
[M!ψ0 , e]ϕ↔ [!ψ0]ϕ one program point
[!ψ0]ϕ0 ↔ (ψ0 → ϕ0) truthfulness
[!ψ0]Kiϕ↔ (ψ0 → Ki [!ψ0]ϕ) kn red(announce)
Table 1: Properties of public announcement.
[M,w]Kiϕ→ (pre(w)→ Ki [M,w]ϕ). This follows since w ≈Vi w, for all i ,V and
w. Conditioning on pre(w) is necessary, as we can now show using announce-
ments: suppose x is false but i does not know this. Then [M!x , e]Ki⊥ (since the
announcement ‘fails’), but obviously we do not have Ki [M!x , e]⊥.
The reader can verify that perfect recall does hold for announcements: from
Ki [!ψ0]ϕ infer ψ0 → Ki [!ψ0]ϕ from which, using kr red(announce), one con-
cludes [!ψ0]Kiϕ. More generally, if the program model M has only one point w,
then perfect recall holds for M,w.
We continue by defining a program model for the other atomic action.
Definition 9 (Simple Toggle) The program model for the program ˜x that
toggles the value of the variable x , is the model M˜x = {a} = {(>, {x})}.
By Definition 5, we have ≈Vi = {(a, a)} for all i ∈ Ag and V ∈ Vis.
Example 3 (Simple Toggle) See Figure 3 (middle) for the program model
for ˜x . On the right of the figure, we have M × M˜x . The properties are
straightforward: we have for instance (M ,w) |= [˜x ](K1x ∧ K2¬y ∧ ¬(K3x ∨
K3y) ∧K4x ∧K5¬y ∧K6(x ∧ ¬y)).
M˜x
M ⇥M˜x
2,3,5
1,3,4 1,3
2,3
a
(v, a) x, y
(w, a) x,¬y (z, a) ¬x,¬y
(u, a) ¬x, y
⇥ =(>, {x})
2,3,5
1,3,4 1,3
2,3
M
¬x, y
v
w
¬x,¬y x,¬y
z
u
x, y
Figure 3: The product M ×M˜x .
The knowledge reduction property for simple toggle, (kn red(toggle), see
Table 2) is even simpler than that for public announcements. Note that the
property does not depend on who sees the toggled variable: both perfect recall
and no surprise hold for simple toggle. An instance of this property (combined
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with the ‘toggle and objective’) is [˜x]Kix ↔ Ki¬x : agent i knows after toggling
of x that x is true, if and only if i knows now that x is false.
Valid properties for toggle (ϕ0 ∈ L0, ϕ ∈ L)
[M˜x, a]ϕ↔ [˜x]ϕ one program point
[˜x]ϕ0 ↔ ˜({x})(ϕ0)) toggle and objective
[˜x]Kiϕ↔ Ki [˜x ]ϕ) kn red(toggle)
Table 2: Properties of simple toggle.
In some sense we are now done: we could proceed by defining program
models for non-deterministic choice (∪) and for sequential composition (;) and,
once those definitions are in place, we could use the equality
x := ϕ
◦
=
(
!(x ↔ ϕ) ∪ (!(x ↔ ¬ϕ); ˜x )) (1)
to define assignments. However, since the definition of program models for
choice and sequential composition are a little involved, we first define a pro-
gram model for assignment, and will then later state that this definition indeed
satisfies (1).
3.2 Assignment
We now define the program model for the assignment x := ϕ. In fact, as we
will later see, x := ¬x and ˜x ‘are the same’.
Suppose we chose to model the assignment x := ϕ by a single pointed model
M, a. Let (M ,w) and (M , u) be two states in an epistemic model. Now suppose
that the truth value of ϕ is different in (M ,w) from the value in (M , u). An
agent who knows that value will not confuse (M , u) with (M ,w), and hence he
will also distinguish (w , a) from (u, a). In particular, an agent who knows the
truth value of ϕ before the assignment x := ϕ will know the value of x after it.
But now suppose we have an agent i who can see x , but who does not know the
value of ϕ. In particular, suppose for this agent, the states (M , u) and (M ,w)
look the same. For this agent, the states (w , a) and (u, a) should look different
(since the agent sees x , which has a different value in each of them), but, by the
definition of product and the fact that wRiu, we get (w , a) ≈Vi (u, a), i.e., they
look the same. Therefore, we will model the assignment with a program model
with two states: one program point in which the value of x stays the same, and
one point in which it gets toggled.
Definition 10 (Assignment) Let x ∈ Var and ϕ ∈ L0. The program model
for the program x := ϕ is defined (see also Figure 4, left) by stipulating Mx :=ϕ =
{s = (x ↔ ϕ, {}), t = (x ↔ ¬ϕ, {x})}.
It is easy to see that s ≈Vi t iff x 6∈ V (i). In sum, s denotes that the value
of x will stay the same, while t denotes that the value of x as a result of the
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s(x$ y, {}) (¬(x$ y), {x})
t
2,3,5
3,4 3
2,3
Mx:=y
M ⇥Mx:=y (v, t) x, y (u, s) x, y
(w, s) ¬x,¬y (z, t) ¬x,¬y
2,3,4,5
Figure 4: The assignment Mx :=y (left) and the model M ×Mx :=y .
assignment, will toggle. Note that the program model for assignment consists
of a basic program (toggle) and an atomic one (announcement).
Example 4 (Assignment) Let us consider the assignment x := y . Its pro-
gram model is given in Figure 4 (left). Also, the product M × Mx :=y of our
example epistemic model M with this program model Mx :=y is given at the
right of that figure. Note that, as expected, agent 1 (who sees x ) comes to learn
the value of y . Symmetrically, agent 2 (who sees y) comes to know the value of
x .
We display some derived properties of assignment in Table 3. Note that an
assignment is basically a choice between two options: either x stays the same
or it changes (third line of the table). For agents that see the variable, those
options are distinguishable (line 4 and 5), for agents that don’t see x , they are
not (line 6).
We noted earlier that perfect recall holds if the program model only holds
one point. We can now use assignments (with models having two points) as an
example of failure of perfect recall. Note that in Example 4, we have M ,w |=
K4[Mx :=y , s]¬x (agent 4 knows in w that x is false, so he knows that if a program
point is executed that keeps the value of x untouched, then afterwards x will still
be false). However, we do not have M ,w |= [Mx :=y , s]K4¬x (if an assignment
x := y is executed, and it happens to be in a state where both x and y are false,
and hence leaves the value of x unchanged, then 4 does not need to know this:
for him, y might have the value true, in which case the value of x was to be
toggled).
Assignments also do not in general satisfy no learning. For an agent i who
sees x for instance, when θ(y) = false, we have [x := y]Ki¬y , but typically not
Ki [x := y]¬y . Indeed, as an effect of the assignment, the agent has learned the
value of y .
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Valid properties for assignment (ϕ0, ψ0 ∈ L0, ϕ ∈ L)
[Mx:=ψ0 , s]ϕ0 ↔ ((x ↔ ψ0) → ϕ0)) no change on s
[Mx:=ψ0 , t]ϕ0 ↔ ((x ↔ ¬ψ0) → ˜({x})(ϕ0)) toggle on t
[x := ψ0]ϕ↔ (x ↔ ψ0 ∧ [Mx :=ψ0 , s]ϕ) ∨ (x ↔ ¬ψ0 ∧ [Mx :=ψ0 , t]ϕ) two choices
Vix → ([x := ψ0]Kiϕ↔ ((x ↔ ψ0) ∧Ki [Mx :=ψ0 , s]ϕ)∨
((x ↔ ¬ψ0) ∧Ki [Mx :=ψ0 , t]ϕ)) knowl. & ass. (1)
¬Vix → ([x := ψ0]Kiϕ↔ (Ki [Mx :=ψ0 , t]ϕ ∧Ki [Mx :=ψ0 , s]ϕ)) knowl. & ass. (2)
Table 3: Properties of assignment.
3.3 Non-deterministic choice
The following validity holds both for pdl (ontic change) and del (information
change):
|= ([pi1]ϕ1 ∧ [pi2]ϕ2)→ [pi1 ∪ pi2](ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)
However, this validity is not appropriate for our framework. Although both
[!x ]Kix and [!¬x ]Ki¬x are validities (regardless of whether x ∈ V (i)), we would
not expect [!x ∪ !¬x ](Kix ∨Ki¬x ) to be valid, since the agent simply does not
need to know which of the two announcements was in fact executed. So, writing
Kwix for Kix ∨ Ki¬x (agent i knows what the value of x is, or, equivalently,
whether x ) we have
6|= ([!x ]Kwix ∧ [!¬x ]Kwix )→ [!x ∪ !¬x ]Kwix
Definition 11 (Choice) Let M1 and M2 be two program models. The non-
deterministic choice between them is defined as the program model M1 ∪ M2.
For programs pi1 and pi2, we define Mpi1∪pi2 = Mpi1 ∪Mpi2 .
Example 5 (Choice) Consider first the program pi
◦
= !x ∪ !¬x and the epis-
temic model M of Example 1. The program model Mpi has two actions, e0
(with precondition ¬x ) and e1 (with precondition x ). No agent can distinguish
e0 from e1 (since no variable is affected). It is easy to check that M × Mpi is
equivalent to M : indeed, no agent learns anything from the program pi.
Secondly, consider the choice between two programs we have considered
before: !x and x := y (see the model on the left in Figure 5). Note that we have
M ,w |= [!x ∪ x := y ]K1(¬x ∧ ¬y). This is as desired: in w , agent 1 knows ¬x ,
so he knows that the announcement !x will not succeed, so the program x := y
will be executed. Since in the resulting state, 1 can see that x is false, he knows
that y is false. We also have M , z |= [!x ∪ x := y ]K1(¬x ∧ ¬y). This is for
similar reasons as the previous case. So we have M |= (¬x ∧ ¬y) → [!x ∪ x :=
y ]K1(¬x ∧ ¬y). For agent 4, note that in M we had ¬x ↔ K4¬x . This is no
longer true after execution of the program: 4 cannot distinguish (w , s) (which
is the result of executing x := y when both x and y are false), from (v , t)
(the result of executing x := y when x is false and y is true). Note that even
agent 6, who sees all variables, is not able to distinguish (u, s) from (u, e): in
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Valid properties for choice (ϕ0 ∈ L0, ϕ ∈ L)
[pi1 ∪ pi2]ϕ0 ↔ ([pi1]ϕ0 ∧ [pi2]ϕ0) choice and objective
[M1 ∪M2,w1]ϕ0 ↔ [M1,w1]ϕ0 if w1 ∈ M1
[M1 ∪M2,w2]ϕ0 ↔ [M2,w2]ϕ0 if w2 ∈ M2
[M1 ∪M2,w]Kiϕ↔(
pre(w) → ∧V∈Vis(χV → ∧w≈Vi uKi [M1 ∪M2, u]ϕ)) kn red(choice)
Table 4: Properties of choice.
u, when x ↔ y ↔ >, the assignment x := y and the announcement that x are
indistinguishable.
s
(x$ y, {})
(¬(x$ y), {x})
t
2,3,5
3,4 3
2,3
(v, t) x, y (u, s) x, y
(w, s) ¬x,¬y (z, t) ¬x,¬y
2,3,4,5
e
(x, {})
1,2,3,4,5,6
2,3,4,5
(z, e) x,¬y
(u, e) x, y
1,2,3,4,5,6
2,3,4,5
1,3
M!x[x:=y M ⇥M!x[x:=y
Figure 5: Program model Mpi with pi
◦
= !x ∪ x := y (left) and M ×Mpi.
When ϕ is not propositional there is not necessarily a decomposition of a
formula of type [M1 ∪ M2,w]ϕ in terms of [M1]ϕ and [M2]ϕ. However, the
knowledge reduction principle still applies (see Table 4). Note that the actions
u for which w ≈Vi u, are taken from the full model M1 ∪M2, not only from the
model where w is from.
3.4 Sequential composition
We now define program composition of two program models M1,M2.
Definition 12 (Product) Let two program models M1 and M2 be given. The
product of M1,M2 is the program model
M1 ⊗M2 = {w ∈ A− × P(Var) | ∃w1 ∈ M1,w2 ∈ M2 such that
pre(w) = pre(w1) ∧ ˜(tgl(w1))(pre(w2)) & tgl(w) = tgl(w1)4tgl(w2)}
(2)
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By denoting a program point by (w1,w2) we imply that it exists as a result
of the above definition, with w1,w2 as the witnesses. For programs pi1 and pi2,
we define Mpi1;pi2 = Mpi1 ⊗Mpi2
This definition is best explained using an example. For this, we use a slightly
more involved starting model than before, see Example 6. Informally, the new
precondition in (w1,w2) guarantees that, for a program M1 ⊗ M2, (w1,w2) to
be executable in a given state, the point w1 needs to be executable now, and
w2 needs to be executable after w1 is finished. For the program x := y ; z := x
for instance (so w1 implements x := y and w2 implements z := x ), suppose
that we are in a state w where (x ↔ ¬y) ∧ (x ↔ z ) holds. In order for w1
to be executable in w , we have pre(w1) = (x ↔ ¬y), and tgl(w1) = {x}, and,
for w2 to be executable in w we require pre(w2) = (x ↔ z ) and tgl(w2) = {}.
However, in order for the sequential composition (w1,w2) to be executable in
w , we have to guarantee that x ↔ ¬y holds, together with ¬x ↔ z : since w2
expects x and z to have the same truth value, and w1 will toggle the value of
x , before the composition is executed, x and z need to have a different value.
In this example, tgl(w1,w2) = {x , z}, which happens to coincide with the union
of tgl(w1) and tgl(w2). However, when executing for instance x := y ; x := ¬y
using two program points, say, w1 and w3, the set of variables to be toggled
would be empty, which is indeed tgl(w1)4tgl(w3).
¬x,¬y,¬z x,¬y,¬z
x, y,¬z
¬x,¬y, z
1,2,4,5
2,3,5
M
x,¬y, z
¬x, y,¬z
¬x, y, z x, y, z
1,3,4
2,5
4
3
w0
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
w6
w7
Figure 6: The epistemic model for Example 6. Each pair of parallel lines is
labeled with the same agents. Not all lines are drawn in the Figure.
Example 6 (Product) Let us now assume Var = {x , y , z} and consider the
program pi
◦
= (z := x ; x := y ; y := z ), which swaps the values of x and y using
a variable z . Let us assume we have five agents: agent 1 sees x , 2 sees y and
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3 sees z . Agents 4 and 5, whose relevance will become clear later, do not see
any variables. However, agent 4 ‘happens to know’ the value of x , while agent
5 happens to know the value of y . Let Mz :=x have two points sz (‘z stays the
same’) and tz (‘z toggles’). Similarly for Mx :=y with points sx and tx , and
model My:=z with points sy and ty . The individual program models for the
three assignments are given in Figure 7.
The states of those models, taken together, give rise to 4 program states
(and not 8 as it would be if we did not remove program points with inconsis-
tent preconditions) in the program model for the composition pi. The program
((tz , sx ), ty) for instance indicates that the value of z will change, that of x
will stay the same, and that of y will change (note the order of assignments
in pi). Note however that its precondition is unsatisfiable: indeed, no program
that swaps the values of x and y can change the value of y but keep that of
x the same, and therefore this program point is not included in the model (we
will shortly give an example of how the pre-condition of a product program is
computed).
The program model for pi is depicted in Figure 8. Let us consider the program
((tz , tx ), ty), which says that all three values of the variables should change. This
would for instance be the case when x is false, y and z are true. At first sight,
one might think that the last assignment y := z would not change the value of
y under this valuation, but when performed after z := x ; x := y the variable
z has of course become false so indeed the assignment y := z will change y ’s
value. This is exactly how the new preconditions in the context of sequential
composition are computed.
1,2,4,5
Mz:=x
(z $ x, {}) (¬(z ! x), {z}) (x$ y, {}) (¬(x$ y), {x})
txsx
Mx:=y
2,3,4,5
tysy
My:=z
1,3,4,5
(y $ z, {}) (¬(y $ z), {y})
tzsz
Figure 7: The three assignments z := x , x := y and y := z .
To stay with the example ((tz , tx ), ty), according to Definition 12 the pro-
gram (tz , tx ) has the precondition pre(tz , tx )
◦
= (z ↔ ¬x ) ∧ (x ↔ ¬y) and
tgl(tz , tx ) = {x , z}. Now, to determine the precondition pre((tz , tx ), ty) we
obtain pre(tz , tx ) ∧ ˜(tgl(tz , tx ))(pre(ty)) which (since ˜(tgl(tz , tx ))(pre(ty)) is˜({x , z}(y ↔ ¬z ) which in turn is y ↔ z ) equals (z ↔ ¬x )∧(x ↔ ¬y)∧(y ↔ z ).
Indeed, if y initially equals z , and z changes its value, then y will also change
its value, during the program pi.
The outcome of performing the assignments pi to M is given in Figure 9.
Where agent 4 knew the value of x in model M , as the result of pi he forgets
the value of x , but learns the values of y and z . Likewise, while agent 5 knew
the value of y in M , in the resulting model he does not remember y , but he has
learned the value of x . The agents 1, 2 and 3 all learn the value of z . In fact,
1 and 2 learn the values of all variables, while 3 learns the new values of y and
18
z . Everybody knows in the new model that y ↔ z . In particular, we have that
3 learns what the old value of x was.
Let us finally mention that there is a program piswap that swaps the values
of x and y in such a way that agent 3 does not learn any of their values:
!(¬x ∧ y); x := >; y := ⊥) ∪ (!(x ∧ ¬y); x := ⊥; y := >) ∪ !x ↔ y
That is, piswap makes a distinction between three mutually exclusive but exhaus-
tive cases:
• x is equivalent to y , in which case, when we want to swap their values,
nothing needs to be done;
• currently we have ¬x ∧ y , in which case piswap assigns the value true to x
and false to y ;
• currently x ∧ ¬y holds, in which case piswap assigns false to x and true to
y .
Note that, e.g., it now holds that ([piswap ]Kwix ↔ Kwiy): an agent will know
the value of x after the swap, only if he knew the value of y before it (likewise, i
will know that value of y after the swap only if the value of x is initially known).
((sz, sx), sy) ((sz, tx), ty)
((tz, sx), sy) ((tz, tx), ty)
((z $ x) ^ (x$ y) ^ (y $ z), {})
(¬(z $ x) ^ (x$ y) ^ (y $ ¬z), {z})
1,2,4,5
((z $ x) ^ ¬(x$ y) ^ ¬(y $ z), {x, y})
(¬(z $ x) ^ ¬(x$ y) ^ ¬(y 6= ¬z), {x, y, z})
1,2,4,5
Mz:=x;x:=y;y:=z
3, 4, 5
3,4,5
Figure 8: The program model for z := x ; x := y ; y := z . Diagonal connections
for the relations ≈Vi are not shown. For instance, we have ((tx , sx ), sy) ≈V4
((sz , tx ), ty).
It is imperative to note that the indistinguishability relation of the compo-
sition follows the general definition of program models; it is derived only from
the tgl sets of the resulting model (given V ). This is in contrast to del, where
the indistinguishability relations of the action models that are composed come
into play. As a result, sequential composition in our setting does not follow
the standard behaviour, in the sense that applying two models in turn and ap-
plying their composition does not always produce equivalent epistemic models
(Example 7):
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1,2,4,5
3,4
000
000, ((sz, sx), sy)
011
100, ((tz, tx), ty)
000
001, ((tz, sx), sy)
100
010, ((sz, tx), ty)
011
101, ((sz, tx), ty)
5
100
011, ((tz, tx), ty)
M ⇥Mz:=x;x:=y;y:=z
111
110, ((tz, sx), sy)
111
111, ((sz, sx), sy)
Figure 9: The product M ×Mz :=x ;x :=y;y:=z .
(
(M ,w)× (M1,w1)
)× (M2,w2) 6≡ (M ,w)× ((M1,w1)⊗ (M2,w2))
This is perfectly normal on an intuitive level: imagine agent 1 observing an
object at all times, while agent 2 leaves and returns some time later, and thus
observes only in the end. Agent 1 should be a able to distinguish between the
case where the object is moved and then put back, and the case where it was
not moved at all, while agent 2 should not.
Example 7 Take an epistemic model with one point w . Suppose V (1) = {x}.
Let M1 = {u, v} = {(>, {x , y}), (>, {y})} and M2 = {w, z} = {(>, {x}), (>, {y})}.
Observe that the agent can distinguish between all different states (Def. 5). In
(M ×M1)×M2 the agent can also distinguish between all states (Def. 6), and
therefore Kw1y is valid. On the other hand, M1⊗M2 = {(>, {x , y}), (>, {y}), (>,
{x}), (>, {})} and the agent cannot distinguish between (v,w) = (>, {x , y})
and (u, z) = (>, {x}), therefore (M × (M1 ⊗ M2), (w , v,w)) ≈V1 (M × (M1 ⊗
M2), (w , u, z)). In these two states y has different values so ¬Kw1y holds.
3.5 Iteration
In dynamic logic, the operation ∗ (Kleene Star) denotes unlimited repetition:
[pi∗]ϕ is true if ϕ holds after any arbitrary number of executions of pi. It can
be used to define the so-called while program (‘while ψ holds, do pi’), as fol-
lows: ((?ψ;pi)∗; ?¬ψ). From a technical point of view, the Kleene star often
leads to complications (cf. [11]). In our setting we can deal with the iteration
that denotes repetition of the operator “;” in a straightforward way. We remind
the reader that this kind of composition is not equivalent to executing actions
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serially, as mentioned in the previous subsection. Some additional needed defi-
nitions follow.
Definition 13 Let ϕ0, ϕ1 ∈ L0. Define var(ϕ0) = {x} if ϕ0 is either x or
¬x . Define var(ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1) = var(ϕ0) ∪ var(ϕ1). Let w be a program point. Let
var(w) = var(pre(w) ∪ tgl(w)). Finally, for a program model M, let var(M) =
∪w∈Mvar(w).
Now suppose M is such that var(M) = X = {x1, . . . , xn}. Then there are
only finitely many program models N with var(N) ⊆ X . This is seen as follows.
Let a valuation description over X be a conjunction of the form l1∧· · ·∧ ln , with
li ∈ {xi ,¬xi}. Then any ϕ0 with var(ϕ0) = X is equivalent to a disjunction
of such valuation descriptions. There are 2n valuation descriptions over X , so
there are 22
n
logically different term formulas ϕ0 with var(ϕ0) = X . Since a
program point is characterised by pre(w) and tgl(w), there are at most 22
n × 2n
different program points over X . Hence there are at most 22
2n×2n different
program models M with var(M) = X . Call this number #(M). Let M1 = M
and Mk = Mk−1;M. We then have:
[M]∗ϕ = [M]ϕ ∧ [M2]ϕ ∧ . . . [M#(M)]ϕ (3)
In words: ϕ is true after an arbitrary number of toggles induced by M iff ϕ
stays true after applying M as often as it is possible to make changes to a
model. This shows that iteration is definable in our framework. For this reason,
we don’t need to deal with iteration any further, and we omit reference to it in
our subsequent analysis.
Remark 1 Note that the above definition is not to say that we semantically
define M∗ as M∗ = M1 ∪ · · · ∪M#(M). This would indeed not be correct, as the
following example shows. Suppose we have an epistemic model M consisting of
only one state w , at which x is true. In particular, at this state, we have that
Kwix , i.e., i knows what the value is of x . Let us also assume that x 6∈ V (i).
Now let M = M˜x from Definition 9, the model that simply toggles the value
of x . Then M ,w |= [M]Kwix and also M ,w |= [M2]Kwix : since i knew the
value of x , as long as he knows how often this values has been toggled, he will
stay aware of that value. However, we do not have M ,w |= [M ∪ M2]Kwix ,
since in the program M ∪ M2, agent i does not know which program point is
executed, i.e., he does not know how often x gets toggled. Note that we do have
M ,w |= [M]∗Kwix , as desired.
3.6 Inductively Defined Pointed Program Models
We make it explicit that the set of all program models and the set of the program
models that can be constructed using the models corresponding to the set of
program Prog , coincide.
Definition 14 We give the set of inductively defined pointed program models,
or IPM(L0,Var), as follows.
21
1. if ϕ0 ∈ A−, then M!ϕ0 , e ∈ IPM(L0,Var)
2. If x ∈ Var then M˜x , a ∈ IPM(L0,Var)
3. If M,w,N, v ∈ IPM(L0,Var) then
(M ∪ N,w), (M ∪ N, v) ∈ IPM(L0,Var)
4. If M,w,N, v ∈ IPM and pre(w) ∧ ˜(tgl(w))(pre(v)) is consistent, then
(M,w ⊗ N, v) ∈ IPM(L0,Var).
Theorem 2 PM(L0,Var) = IPM(L0,Var).
Proof It is clear that PM(L0,Var) contains M!ϕ0 , e and M˜x , a, and is closed
under non-deterministic choice and ‘consistent’ sequential composition. This
implies that PM(L0,Var) ⊇ IPM(L0,Var). For ⊆, let M,w ∈ PM(L0,Var).
Take a program point u ∈ M and let tgl(u) = {x1, . . . , xn}. We have that u is
equal to the program !pre(u); ˜x1; . . . ; ˜xn and so it can obviously be inductively
defined. M =
⋃
u∈M{u} thus M itself (and therefore M,w) can be inductively
defined.
After this theorem it should be clear that the existence of more than one
program points in a model can be attributed to the program’s non-deterministic
character; the only way to introduce new points is through non-deterministic
choice ∪. “Vision” then provides a way to resolve uncertainty in case it provides
proof of what actually occurred during the computation. On that note we
can also elaborate on our statement that non-deterministic choice is given a
realistic interpretation. One can alternatively think of semi-public environments
that the execution is not being performed publicly, but each agent is given
a range of deterministic programs (the program points that are of the form
!pre(u); ˜x1; . . . ; ˜xn) from which one will be executed. Thus effectively ‘hiding’
non-deterministic operators behind the agent’s ignorance.
3.7 Completeness
Using the validities for our logic of semi-public environments, it is possible to
eliminate programs from formulas, thereby proving Theorem 1 (for details on
a similar translation – for the logic of action models – we refer the reader to
[27]). In other words, we can reduce the logic of semi-public environments to
a multi-agent epistemic logic enriched with a notion of vision expressed by the
atoms Vix . Starting with the standard S5n validities for knowledge modalities
Ki , and then by adding two additional axioms for the Vi operators we have a
sound and complete axiomatisation for the logic “S5+V”. Putting everything
together we obtain the following result:
Theorem 3 The formulas in Table 5 constitute a sound and complete axioma-
tisation for the logic of semi-public environments.
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Propositional Component
ϕ if ϕ is a prop. tautology
Epistemic Component
Vix → (Kix ∨Ki¬x ) seeing implies knowing
Vix → KjVix vision is common knowledge
Ki(ϕ→ ψ) → (Kiϕ→ Kiψ) K -axiom
Kiϕ→ ϕ veridicality (truth axiom)
Kiϕ→ KiKiϕ positive introspection
¬Kiϕ→ Ki¬Kiϕ negative introspection
Dynamic Component (ϕ0 ∈ L0, ϕ, ψ ∈ L)
[M,w]ϕ0 ↔ (pre(w) → ˜(tgl(w))(ϕ0) ontic change
[M,w]Vix ↔ (pre(w) → Vix ) vision permanence
[M,w]¬ϕ↔ (pre(w) → ¬[M,w]ϕ) program and negation
[M,w](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ ([M,w]ϕ ∧ [M,w]ψ) program and conjunction
[M,w]Kiϕ↔
(
pre(w) → ∧V∈Vis(χV → ∧w≈Vi uKi [M, u]ϕ)) program and knowledge
Rules of Inference
if ` ϕ and ` (ϕ→ ψ) then ` ψ modus ponens
if ` ϕ then ` Kiϕ knowledge-necessitation
if ` ϕ then ` [M,w]ϕ program-necessitation
if ` ψ1 ↔ ψ2 then ` ϕ[ψ1/ψ] ↔ [ψ2/ψ] substitution of equivalents
Table 5: Axiomatisation
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Observe that we do not include an axiom to immediately translate formulas
of the form [M1,w1][M2,w2]ϕ but this can be overcome by starting the trans-
lation from the innermost dynamic operator. This is facilitated by the rule of
substitution of equivalents (which says that provably equivalent formulas can
be substituted for each other within a formula ψ without effecting the truth of
ψ —- see for instance [16, Section 5] for more on this rule).
We refer to axiom Vix → KjVix as “vision is common knowledge”. This
terminology may appear to be misleading, given the fact that we do not have
operators for common knowledge in our object language. However, the ax-
iom, together with knowledge-necessitation and the K -axiom, guarantees that
common knowledge of vision can be obtained in the following sense: any for-
mula of the form Vix → Kj1 . . .KjnVix is a theorem. (To see a derivation
of Vix → K1K2K3Vix , note that by the axiom under consideration, we have
Vix → K3Vix , and, by knowledge necessitation K2(Vix → K3Vix ) from which,
using the K axiom, we obtain K2Vix → K2K3Vix . Since we also have Vix →
K2Vix , we then get Vix → K2K3Vix . Applying once more necessitation and
the K -axiom for agent 1, we get the desired result).
Finally, note that the models of S5+V are what we intended from the start.
Vision of the value of a variable works as a ‘lower bound’ for the knowledge of
its value, and Vix is either true in all of the possible worlds, or false (in all
possible worlds).
4 When are two programs the same?
In modal logic (a good reference is [4]), the notion of bisimulation helps to give
an answer to the question: when are two pointed models the same? Being
bisimilar (written (M ,w) ↔ (M ′,w ′)) guarantees that (M ,w) and (M ′,w ′)
satisfy the same static formulas, and on finite models, the converse holds as well.
We assume the reader to be familiar with the notion of bisimulation between
epistemic models: we state the key clauses without further explanation.
Formally, if M = 〈W ,R,V , f 〉 and M ′ = 〈W ′,R′,V ′, f ′〉 are two epistemic
models, in order for a bisimulation R to have B(w ,w ′), we require that
Atom f (w) = f ′(w ′) and ∀i V (i) = V ′(i);
Forth-Bisim If for some v ∈W we have wRiv then for some v ′ ∈W ′ we have
w ′R′iv
′ and B(v , v ′);
Back-Bisim If for some v ′ ∈ W ′ we have w ′R′iv ′ then for some v ∈ W we
have w ′Riv and B(v , v ′);
We use B : (M , s) ↔ (M ′, s ′) for the claim that B is a bisimulation between
M and M ′ such that R(s, s ′).
Proposition 1 Suppose (M , s) ↔ (M ′, s ′). Also suppose M, s is such that
M , s |= pre(s). Then (M ×M, (s, s)) ↔ (M ′ ×M, (s ′, s)).
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Proof The proof of Proposition 1 follows that of [27, Proposition 6.21], and
is constructive: assume B : (M , s) ↔ (M ′, s ′) is the witness the bisimulation
of the epistemic models. Then consider B′, defined by B′((u, u), (u ′, u′) iff
both B(u, u ′) and u = u′. We leave it to the reader to show that B′ : (M ×
M, (s, s)) ↔ (M ′ ×M, (s ′, s)).
Following work by van Eijck et. al ([31, 19]) we propose a notion of ‘equiv-
alence’ for program models. Our presentation is similar to the exposition of
[27, Chapter 6, Section 6.1], here, we built on results presented there, and will
focus in our proofs on the differences. Note that where [27] talks about ac-
tion bisimulation and action emulation, in our terminology this will be program
bisimulation and program emulation. The idea is that we want to achieve that
if two pointed program models emulate, then for every pointed epistemic model
(M ,w), we have ((M ,w)× (M,w)) ↔ ((M ,w)× (M′,w′)), and hence, the two
programs (M,w) and (M′,w′) have the same effect (see Proposition 4). Program
emulation is weaker than program bisimulation: here, the idea is that having
two programs emulate is a sufficient (Theorem 4) and necessary (Theorem 5)
condition to make them have the ‘same effect’ on epistemic models.
Definition 15 (Bisimulation of program models) Given two pointed pro-
gram models (M,w), (M′,w′), and a vision function V , a program bisimulation
between them is a relation Bp ⊆ (M×M′) such that Bp(w,w′) and the following
three conditions are met for each agent i (for arbitrary program points):
• Here-Bisim p If Bp(u, u′), then pre(u)↔ pre(u′) and tgl(u) = tgl(u′).
• Forth-Bisim p If Bp(u, u′) and u ≈Vi v, then there is v′ ∈ M′ such that
R(v, v′);
• Back-Bisim p If Bp(u, u′) and u′ ≈Vi v′, then there is v ∈ M such that
R(v, v′);
We write M,w ↔Vp M′,w′ if there is a program bisimulation Bp ⊆ (M × M′)
based on V for which Bp(w,w
′).
The reader will notice that bisimulation and emulation have a vision function
V as a parameter. This is to be expected since we need a vision function
V to produce an indistinguishability relation for the program models we are
comparing. Also, as we have already stated, we are interested in the effect these
programs would have on the same epistemic model, therefore it also makes sense
to compare program models using the same V .
Comparing our Forth-Bisimp clause with that of Forth-Bisim above, and
with the Forth-clause for action models, the reader would expect
• Forth-Bisim ′p If Bp(u, u′) and u ≈Vi v, then there is v′ ∈ M′ such that
u′ ≈Vi v′ and R(v, v′);
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Indeed, it can be shown that this is equivalent to Forth-Bisim p: by Here-
Bisim p, Bp(u, u
′), u ≈Vi v and Bp(v, v′), it follows that u′ ≈Vi v′. A similar
remark applies to Back-Bisim p. To emphasise this further we provide the
following propositions.
For a program model M, a program point w, vision function V and agent i ,
define RM,Vi (w) = {u ∈ M | w ≈Vi u}.
Proposition 2 Let (M,w), (M′,w′) be two pointed program models. Then:
M,w ↔Vp M′,w′ iff for all i ∈ Ag, RM,Vi (w) = RM
′,V
i (w
′).
Proposition 3 Let (M,w), (M′,w′) be two pointed program models and V ,Y
two vision functions. If M,w ↔Vp M′,w′ and V ⊆ Y , then M,w ↔Yp M′,w′
The following proposition captures our main intention for bisimulation.
Proposition 4 Suppose we have an epistemic pointed model M , s with M , s |=
pre(s) and vision function V , and two pointed program models M, s and M′, s′
such that M, s ↔Vp M′, s′. Then
(M ×M, (s, s)) ↔ (M ×M′, (s, s′))
Proof The proof is similar to that of [27, Proposition 6.23]. Let Bp be the
program bisimulation between M, s and M′, s′. Then B′ is a witness for the
claim we are after:
B′((u, u)(v , v)) iff u = v and Bp(u, v)
It should now be clear why the condition tgl(u) = tgl(u′) in Here-Bisimp,
which does not occur for action models, is needed: since our programs can
change the state, we only want to identify states that make the same changes.
The reader should convince herself that our Here-Bisimp clause is necessary
to show the Atom case in Proposition 4.
The following corollary follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 4.
Corollary 1 Let M be an epistemic model with vision function V . If (M , s) ↔
(M ′, s ′) and (M, s)↔Vp (M′, s′) then (M ×M, (s, s)) ↔ (M ′ ×M′, (s ′, s′)).
We now introduce the notion of program emulation, which is a weaker form
of structural similarity compared to that of program bisimulation, but still guar-
antees bisimilarity of epistemic states, when programs that emulate each other,
are executed on it. Roughly, this weakening is obtained as follows. Rather than
requiring that two program points (as is program bisimulation) have exactly the
same preconditions, for emulation, it is sufficient that one precondition entails
the other— as long as the weaker condition is compensated for by a number of
alternatives: see the requirements Forth-Emul and Back-Emul below.
Definition 16 (Emulation) Given two pointed program models (M,w), (M′,w′),
and a vision function V , a program emulation between them is a relation
E ⊆ (M × M′) such that E(w,w′) and the following three conditions are met
for each agent i (for arbitrary program points):
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• Here-Emul If E(u, u′), then pre(u)∧pre(u′) is consistent and, moreover,
tgl(u) = tgl(u′).
• Forth-Emul If E(u, u′) and u ≈Vi v, then there are v′1, ...v′n ∈ M′ such
that for all k = 1, ...,n, E(v, v′k ), and such that pre(v) |= pre(v′1) ∨ · · · ∨
pre(v′k ) and tgl(v) = tgl(v
′
1) = · · · = tgl(v′n).
• Back-Emul If E(u, u′) and u′ ≈Vi v′, then there are v1, ...vn ∈ M such
that for all k = 1, ...,n, E(vk , v
′), and such that pre(v′) |= pre(v1) ∨ · · · ∨
pre(vn) and tgl(v
′) = tgl(v1) = · · · = tgl(vn).
A total emulation E : M V M′ is an emulation such that for each w ∈ M
there is a w′ ∈ M′ with E(w,w′) and vice versa.
It should be clear that a program bisimulation is also a program emulation.
Example 8 Consider the models M!ϕ0∨ψ0 = {e = (ϕ0 ∨ψ0, ∅)} and M!ϕ0∪!ψ0 =
{e1 = (ϕ0, ∅), e2 = (ψ0, ∅)}. The reader can easily check E = {(e, e1), (e, e2)} is
a total emulation.
The following theorem shows that program emulation guarantees bisimula-
tion of results:
Theorem 4 Let M be an epistemic model with vision function V . If MV M′
then (M ×M) ↔ (M ×M′).
Proof The proof of this theorem is similar to that of [27, Proposition 6.30].
The bisimulation that we are after is defined as
B((w ,w), (w ,w′)) iff w = v and (M,w)V (M′,w′)
We leave it to the reader thatB indeed is a bisimulation between static epistemic
models.
In our setting preconditions are only propositional and, by altering the proof
of the related property [6, Proposition 2] accordingly, we get the following extra.
Theorem 5 Let M be an epistemic model with vision function V . If (M ×
M) ↔ (M ×M′) then MV M′.
It is also natural to consider when two programs are ‘the same’ directly with
respect to what agents can actually reason about – namely, formulas.
Definition 17 Let us write (in the meta language) pi1 ∼ pi2 to mean that for
all ϕ ∈ L, we have |= [Mpi1 ]ϕ↔ [Mpi2 ]ϕ.
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This approach has its own interest even outside the context of an agent’s
epistemic reasoning. Let M be a model and w ∈ M . Applying models Mpi1
and Mpi2 will result in worlds of the form (w , u1) and (w , u2) with u1 and u2
being points of the first and second program model respectively. So we have
a partition of the resulting static models based on the first component. The
definition then says that the programs are ‘equal’ if: ϕ is valid in a part of
M ×Mpi1 iff it is valid in the respective part of M ×Mpi2 . It is therefore evident
that this definition is a stronger version of model equivalence.
Theorem 6 pi1 ∼ pi2 iff for all functions V ∈ Vis, Mpi1 V Mpi2 .
Proof From left to right: Let V be a vision function and M a model with that
vision function. As we pointed out before, we have (M ×Mpi1) ≡ (M ×Mpi2). In
our setting all models are finite, so (cf. [5]) we further have (M ×Mpi1) ↔ (M ×
Mpi2). By Theorem 5 we have Mpi1 V Mpi2 . From right to left: Let E be
the assumed emulation. By the proof of Theorem 4, we know that there is a
bisimulation between (M×Mpi1 , (w1, u1)) and (M×Mpi2 , (w2, u2)) if w1 = w2 and
E(u1, u2). Now assume M ,w |= [Mpi1 ]ϕ i.e., for every u ∈ Mpi1 such that M ,w |=
pre(u), it holds that M ×Mpi1 , (w , u) |= ϕ. Because E is a total emulation and
because of the fact that bisimilarity implies point-wise equivalence, we also have
M ,w |= [Mpi2 ]ϕ.
Example 9 We have the following equivalences.
• (!ϕ0 ∪ !ψ0) ∼ !(ϕ0 ∨ ψ0)
• ˜x ∼ (x := ¬x )
Remark 2 In our program models, agent i cannot distinguish points u and w if
from the variables he sees, those affected by u are the same as those affected by
w. This may seem weird, because it might be that u would change x from false
to true, while w does the opposite. However, this is harmless, because those
points will have preconditions (¬x and x , respectively) that i can distinguish.
However, for the Boolean domain one can (and for domains with more than
two values, one needs to) model change as follows. Consider x := ϕ again.
In the Boolean domain, we take three program points for the program model.
One of those three points is similar to s, representing ‘stay the same’. Then,
we have a state t1, representing ‘change from false to true’, with precondition
(¬x ∧ϕ) and a program point t2, representing ‘change from true to false’, with
precondition (x ∧¬ϕ). We replace tgl by a set upd. For instance, we would have
upd(t1) = {x 7→ >} and upd(t2) = {x 7→ ⊥}, where {x 7→ >}ϕ0 would then be
defined as ϕ0[>/x ].
5 Discussion
5.1 Related Work
Our work is most closely related to that of van Benthem et al [21] which stud-
ies information change combined with ‘factual alteration’. This work places
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the emphasis on reduction axioms and the underlying system ‘is capable of ex-
pressing all model-shifting operations with finite action models’ [21, page 1].
However, as explained on [21, page 6], an approach where one has regular op-
erations (choice, sequence and iteration) to make structured programs starting
from simple actions is not examined. Moreover, there is no notion of visibility
in [21].
Our work is also related to ‘Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Assignment’
[26]. However, there are some important differences. We aim at modelling
a computational environment, where program variables are first class citizens:
they receive values during a commonly known computation, while agents derive
their knowledge from the variables they observe and the program that is being
executed. The motivation in [26] is more general: its starting point is del,
to which an assignment of the form p := ϕ is added, that is, some atomic
propositions receive a new value. The logic of [26] includes common knowledge
and more general update operators than just public announcement. However,
there is a price to pay for this generality: [26] gives only one relevant semantic
principle, whereas we provide a complete axiomatisation. Moreover, in our
framework, the notion of visibility (of variables, by agents) plays a central role.
This makes it possible to exactly formalise the interaction between assignments,
visibility, and knowledge. No such principles are given in [26]. One might
argue that Vix (agent i sees x ) in our framework might be mimicked in [26]
as Kix ∨ Ki¬x . However, this still does not give the same behaviour in our
system: in [26], even if the agent knows the value of x , and he observes the
public program x := y , if he does not know the value of y , he will ‘forget’ the
value of x ! Of course, a formula of the form Vix ↔ Kix ∨Ki¬x is not valid in
our semantics (an agent may know more than is implied by just the variables
he sees).
Another line of relevant work is the “Dynamic Logic of Propositional As-
signments” ([1]), or DL-PA for short. We claim that for the case of a finite set
of variables Var we can embed this language into to our framework. We make
the comparison firstly based on the language used. In DL-PA the language (let
us call it LDLPA) comprises programs pi ::= +p | −p | pi;pi | pi ∪ pi | pi∗ | ?ϕ and
formulas ϕ ::= p | > | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | [pi]ϕ. Atoms +p (and −p respectively)
can be translated in our setting to programs [p := >] and the rest of the pro-
gram connectives translate as expected. Another subtle difference is that the
tests of DL-PA can include programs, however it is also the case in DL-PA that
all formulas are equivalent to some program-free formula, and so we can use
this reduct for our version of tests. Regarding semantics, the models of DL-PA
are those of propositional logic, i.e., valuations. The translation of this to our
setting would be any model M = 〈W ,R,V , f 〉, with W the set of all valuations,
f (w) = w and for each i ∈ AG,V (i) = ∅. The accessibility relation R could
be anything again due to the lack epistemic modalities, and for each agent i ,
V (i) has to be empty so that ∪ would indeed be non-deterministic and no agent
finds a way around it using his vision. Finally, for t(ϕ) being the translation
we mention above, we claim that for every ϕ ∈ LDLPA, ϕ is valid in DL-PA iff
t(ϕ) is valid in the logic of semi-public environments. We ought to mention that
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this claim is not true between DL-PA and PDL (with atomic programs those of
propositional assignment).
We should also mention the relationship of our work to the logic AC of
action models for DEL [27, Chapter 6]. It should be the case that since DEL
and Semi-Public Environments share (almost) the same class of static models,
and program models have the capacity for both epistemic and ontic change,
all reasoning performed in AC is also possible in semi-public environments.
This would be true, were it not for the fact that public announcements in
our setting only involve term formulas. We could start by translating action
points to program points with empty toggle sets. But action models have the
flexibility of having any kind of indistinguishability relation between their action
points and by making all program points have empty toggle sets we lose that
flexibility. It is then, that one can decide to add ‘dummy’ variables to the toggle
sets, mentioned only therein, and fix the vision functions appropriately, so as to
achieve the indistinguishability relation one wants. Regarding the common trait
of action and program models, that is, their ability to change the knowledge
of an agent: in epistemic models the worlds represent the agent’s epistemic
alternatives. By using the preconditions of action or program models, one can
eliminate alternatives by making worlds ‘vanish’. But with program models
one can eliminate alternatives also by changing the worlds themselves. The
exact relation between the effects of these two approaches, and always within
a multi-agent environment, is worth investigating both from a technical and
philosophical aspect.
In [14] Levesque gives a version of ‘only-knowing’ using ‘knowing-at-least’
and ‘knowing-at-most’ modalities. Vix can be thought of as “agent i ‘knows-
at-least’ formula Kix ∨ Ki¬x”. This also brings in mind the possibility to
implement vision for other formulas as well, so we would have Viϕ where ϕ is
not necessarily a (propositional) variable.
In the work of [23] agents can see some of the propositional variables (as in
our paper), but in addition they can control some, i.e., for each variable there
is an agent who controls its truth-value. In fact, this work sits in a sequence
of papers where the notion of control, and also that of the transfer of control
is studied ([10, 24, 13]). It is interesting to note here that, no matter whether
such an approach includes an epistemic component or not, the dynamics of those
systems can be modelled using our program models.
The Situation Calculus studies scenarios like the ones we presented here
([17], and many related papers). Although the language and models in this
line of work are similar to ours, more work is needed to establish the precise
technical relationships.
It may be tempting to think that there is a connection between our notion
of vision of variables, and the notion of awareness, which, in the context of
epistemic logic, dates back to [7] (see also [18] for a contemporary overview).
However, there are major differences. For an agent i who is not aware of x , the
formula Ki(x ∨ ¬x ) would typically be false. Compare that to an agent who
does not know, and hence does not see the value of x . For such an agent, in our
set-up, Ki(x ∨ ¬x ) would hold. The agent is aware of x , or, put differently, the
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agent knows about x . Of course, the well-informed agent is he who even knows
the value of x (possibly because it is seen by the agent): (Kix ∨Ki¬x ). In this
case, the agent knows the value of x , or, the agent knows whether x .
5.2 Conclusions & Future Work
We have provided a sound and complete axiomatisation for a logic of semi-public
environments, showing that it is equivalent to epistemic logic enriched with a
notion of vision. We introduced program models which cater for ontic and epis-
temic change, which also have a grounded semantics, based on the vision of the
agents. Using those program models, we then gave a realistic interpretation of
non-deterministic choice, and analysed the non-standard behaviour of sequential
composition and iteration within the context of Semi-Public Environments. In
contrast to action models, program models can be fully conceived of as syntactic
objects, releasing one from the need to justify including them in the object lan-
guage. Nevertheless, it is possible to take a semantic view of program models,
which allowed us to compare them as mathematical structures, in particular,
giving sufficient conditions on two program points being ‘the same’.
There are many lines of possible future research. A rich vein of possible fu-
ture work would involve lifting the various restrictions on our model. We might
start with the restriction that preconditions are propositional formulas. Another
restriction which might be worth softening, is the assumption that it is com-
mon knowledge which variables are seen by whom (note that this assumption is
also taken in the interpreted systems paradigm: there, it is common knowledge
that agents know the value of their local variables, or what the program under
execution is). Those assumptions seem related, and removing them may well
be a way to reason about Knowledge-based Programs [9], where the programs
are distributed over the agents, and where it would be possible to branch in
a program depending on the knowledge of certain agents. We also ought to
consider actions that change vision itself, introduce higher order vision, as well
as challenge the automatic connection between vision and knowledge; an agent
seeing something might not necessarily mean that he realises it. An aspect of
this form of omniscience is present for example in axiom Vix → KiVix . Van
Eijck ([30]) makes such a distinction between actual perception and capabil-
ity of perception, and includes actions for commonly known changes to vision,
unobserved change, and observation of an action witnessed by a group.
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